Baumard suggests that gradual technological accumulation increased standards of living, which in turn may have triggered a change to a slower life history strategy, responsible for accelerating innovations. Here, we assert that Baumard omits the other part of the story: it is not only in affluent and stable environments that innovation can occur. Scarce environments are known to trigger fast life history strategies, which might stimulate problem-based innovations (i.e., when the opportunity cost of the individuals is close to zero). Although this perspective is highlighted by the rich economic and agricultural literature (Garcia & Calantone 2002; Reij & Waters-Bayer 2014), the question of the nature of its psychological pathways still holds. We argue that risk taking, sensation seeking, and local cooperation might be key features in understanding the dynamics of low-opportunity-cost innovations.

Baumard applies a life history framework to resolve the puzzle brought by the so-called “Great Divergence” or “European Miracle.” To do so, the author argues that one necessary condition for technological innovation is an “affluent and stable environment” (sect. 1.2, para. 4). Although it is possible that abundant environments may trigger certain types of innovations, so do scarce environments. In a study conducted in Tanzania, students from the Wageningen Agricultural University found that whereas rich farmers innovate as a result of intrinsic reasons (curiousness, entrepreneurship), poor farmers innovate as a result of both extrinsic (monetary rewards, social status change) and intrinsic (creativity, risk-taking, etc.) factors. The poorest farmers had to resort to combining manure, urine, and crop residues to maintain the fertility of their soils. In this study, the authors did not find any resource-innovation correlation. This apparent contradiction comes from (1) poor conceptualization of the term innovation (Garcia & Calantone 2002); (2) underestimation of the role of fast life history strategy in promoting some types of innovation (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2009; Reji & Waters-Bayer 2014); and (3) ignoring capital role in innovation promotion (Verhoeven & van der Kroon 1999).

First, Baumard's focus on technological innovations lacks a clear definition. In a highly influential paper, Garcia and Calantone (2002) argue that there are many types of innovation, some involving riskier behaviors than others. For example, radical innovation usually requires discontinuity at both the macro (world/market/industry) and micro (firm/customer, e.g., the World Wide Web) levels. This type of innovation is quite rare and costly, even in rich countries, as it is supposed to make dramatic changes in research/marketing efforts. Discontinuity in one of the two levels (micro/macro), but not both, characterize really new innovations (e.g., Sony Walkman, Canon Laserjet, early fax machines). Song and Montoya-Weiss (1998) suggest that really new innovations include (1) new technology, (2) significant impact, and (3) being the first of its kind. Other conceptualizations of innovation include discontinuous (with 5–10 improvements in performance, 30%–50% reduction in cost, and new unique features); incremental (using existing technology to make micro-level shifts); and imitative innovations (iterative nature, new at the firm/industry level but not at the market level) levels. Although some innovations occurring during the Industrial Revolution could be classified as radical, many innovations occurring in agriculture could instead be categorized as really new. We defend here that really new innovations could be explained by both slow or fast life history strategy.

Indeed, as stated by Baumard himself, adverse childhood correlates with sensation seeking and risk taking, one of many characteristics of fast life history strategy. A vast literature associates sensation seeking and risk taking with entrepreneurial, financial, and agricultural innovations (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2009; Reij & Waters-Bayer 2014). In many cases, agricultural innovations in poor countries involve family/local support systems, as new techniques require more labor and resources, which also involve more risks. The latter is actually a good example of how scarce environments may trigger innovations when the opportunity cost is close to zero. As Reij and Waters-Bayer (2014) exemplify:

Population pressure on a limited natural resource base appears to be an important incentive for innovating and investing in agricultural diversification and intensification. Where farmers have their ‘backs against the wall’ and few options left, experimentation and innovation find ‘fertile ground’. Farmer innovators frequently recount that they were driven by the need to feed their families. For example, when Yacouba Sawadogo was confronted with frequent harvest failures provoked by droughts in the 1970s and many villagers migrated to other regions, he decided to stay on the land of his ancestors and find solutions to this problem. Many similar stories could be told. (p. 83)

Still, although richer and more stable countries might promote high-scale cooperation (e.g., federal taxes), living in a harsh environment may motivate people to collaborate on resolving local issues that need innovative perspectives. A dramatic example comes from neighborhoods with violence-based issues: either the community collaborates to maintain the system (and the economic spinoffs, such as in drug trafficking) or decides to end the supply by cutting off and expulsing the demands (Sampson et al. 1997). Social cohesion among neighbors promotes informal mechanisms that monitor peer groups, prevent truancy, and maintain public order. Again, faced with low-opportunity-cost challenges, individuals sometimes cooperate with one another on behalf of the common good.

In summary, although some innovations seem to be explained by slow life history strategy (individual based, large initial investment, intrinsically motivated), we argue that other innovations may emerge in scarce environments when there is near-zero opportunity cost (problem based, low monetary investment, extrinsically motivated). But how do we explain the high visibility of the former over the latter? One possibility is that to make technological innovation famous, a minimum amount of capital is needed to afford supplies, materials, patents, and marketing. Although such things are difficult in Africa, Reijs and Water-Bayer (2014) still identified more than 1000 innovations during a 2-year research program covering farming innovations. Psychological pathways explaining these innovations include risk taking, impulsivity, and problem-oriented strategies. Further studies are needed to explore the dual-cognitive process that may lead to innovation.